Security, NHS National Programme for ITSecurity mattersMike Howse, UK Managing Director of data security specialist Protegrity, on ensuring the integrity of the National Spine March 2007 In 2005, when rollout of the NHS patient records database began, Kingsbury-based GP Dr Paul Thornton warned of the potential abuse of the new system: “The problem is that once the information gets on the NHS spine, there is a very real threat that this information could go all over the place”, he said. Confidential personal information, centralised for efficiency and collaborative analysis, is a prime target for unintended distribution and, worse, for criminal misuse. As well as ensuring the (appropriate) availability of any information that comes into its possession, an organisation must take care to protect this information against unauthorised use or disclosure and ensure compliance with any security policies by the system’s workforce. There is an urgent need for implementing system-wide database-access controls in the NHS (see What are access controls? below), coupled with strategically implemented encryption. Centrally managed, this provides the most compelling solution to the problem of holding patient records and information securely. Data encryptionEncrypting data is an important tool when it comes to keeping patient information safe. IT security professionals must not only take care to establish rigorous security policies but they must consistently promote them and regularly audit their effectiveness. The technical operations that encrypt clear-text data (see jargon buster) eg a database column, a radiology image file, crucial medication histories or family history data lock the information in a mathematical scramble that is profoundly difficult, if not impossible, to restore to its original state. Once granted entry by an IT security policy that defines authorised use, however, legitimate users of the information, and computer applications identified as germane to NHS objectives can gain access to the data in its original format. The decryption of the scrambled content or application occurs transparently when an encryption key unlocks the seemingly random data tangle and presents the now readable information. Also, best practice in security administration dictates that there be explicit separation of roles and duties system administrators do not need access to individual patient information. One type of separation is that security managers policies and their encryption solutions distinguish between security administrators and NHS providers. Those who do not have access under a specific security policy either cannot gain access to the encrypted data at all, or are able to access only the encrypted content. Of equal importance, today's data security management solutions (encompassing data encryption and other forms of data-threat management) audit all access attempts, so that security administrators may report to management on the overall security of the system. This kind of information becomes part of the reporting demanded both by legislation and by patients. The cost of security breaches has, for years, been based directly on the cost of remediation. However, classic models to determine the appropriate level of security spending were developed before state entities had the responsibility to protect personal, intimate, healthcare information. The need for cultural changeEven as more healthcare organisations develop increasingly detailed security policies and hire compliance officers, security managers continue to report that the regulations and security policies are not translating into behavioural change. If anything, security managers report sporadic enforcement of security policies and growing confusion related to the ownership of the data-protection problem in healthcare environments. In some organisations, many different departments and teams own some part of the data-security/privacy problem, the result being difficulty in reaching decisions and deploying technology and process change. It is time to acknowledge that security policies and technology alone, without buy-in by healthcare staff and enforcement by management, will not resolve the needs for regulatory compliance nor for the safety of patient information. Security tools will play their role in securing sensitive data from acquisition by the enterprise through its use, storage and subsequent deletion. It remains the task of NHS management, however, to make real-world assessments of risks to data, how these risks are best mitigated and how these assessment decisions are enforced throughout the healthcare spine. The real challenge is in establishing a genuine culture of security where staff and management view the security of healthcare data as essential for the success of their organisation and for the health of the communities they serve. Achieving data securityFor NHS managers, particularly those involved in web-based transactions, securing the information resource means network firewalls at the perimeter, defending internal IT processes from outside attack and other malicious behaviour. Some of these firewalls offer rudimentary network protection for data while in transit. More sophisticated web-application types of security actually inspect the data itself to determine if it is what the internal client applications expect to receive. These kinds of data protection are generally understood hospitals and surgeries use network firewalls already; they are moving toward a greater appreciation for the web-application type today. How about the data inside the firewalled perimeter? Internal staff access files of all types and use applications that call on information in their day-to-day operations. Now and in the future, more staff, and third-party service providers, need access to this information while working remotely. Data encryption is the most reliable means of protecting this data and controlling who gets to use it, while making it available to the appropriate people. It is central to NHS objectives to know what data and what applications require the greatest protection and control, and very often the amount of data, its value and its location are unknown. Once an organisation knows what to protect and how to comply with applicable regulations, it can implement the steps required to meet the actual requirements of the regulations. With so many privacy and compliance regulations overlapping in protecting data, and because Spine managers recognise the broad spectrum of legitimate potential users accessing patient data, it would be wise to follow the recommendations below: Tips for protecting data
Remember that liability for data breaches cannot be outsourced. Business partners and outsourcing service providers may be a black hole for sensitive-data handling. Review third-party processor contracts, and implement a partner/service provider evaluation process. A system-wide policyThe patient-record system is a valuable national resource for the
healthcare of individual citizens, as a data resource for
preventative care regimens and medical study, and as a potential
foundation for new treatment techniques giving enhanced
quality-of-life. It is also a system used by humans and hence
subject to unintentional misuse as well as deliberate abuse. By
identifying and eliminating practice redundancies, and by employing
a common set of automated policies and technologies, a value-based
culture of data security will protect this resource while allowing
it to be used most efficiently and beneficially. System-wide
data-security management is vital for its success. Jargon busterAccess controls
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